INTRODUCTION
The dominance of command-and-control regulation in the environmental regulatory scheme has long been criticized as expensive, ineffective, and insensitive to the realities of industry. Despite these critiques, environmental law and policy in the United States has not seen significant reform in the past twenty-five years, resulting in the development of a deeply adversarial system of regulation that often leads to compliance failures. A signatory to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change "Paris Agreement," the United States has made a renewed commitment to reduce our nation's contributions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a part of a global initiative to slow or possibly prevent the potentially catastrophic effects of climate change. The advent of this international agreement, and the establishment of our Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under it, provide an excellent opportunity to re-evaluate the efficacy of our existing framework of regulation, and to consider what might be done to improve industry compliance.
This Note argues not that command-and-control regulations in the environmental regulatory scheme should be replaced entirely, but that they may be supplemented through implementing transparency mandates that promote self-regulation. While transparency policies have a wide range of potential application across various regulatory sectors, the focus of this Note is on the utility of those policies in reducing GHGs: particularly, how these policies could be implemented to achieve the levels of reductions promised in the Paris Agreement as a part of reducing our nation's NDCs. By looking at the recent transparency policy implemented by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding the sourcing of conflict minerals, this Note suggests that GHG emissions could be curbed through the implementation of a reporting system like that used by the SEC, combined with one of the darlings of the Information Age-a rating system. Combining corporate reporting requirements with an effective rating system has the potential to reward good corporate behavior through a market-based response based on consumer knowledge of those corporations' performance.
Part I provides a brief background on the development of commandand-control regulation and its dominance in American environmental regulatory law. Part II will explain the short-comings of command-andcontrol regulation, specifically in relation to air pollution and in reducing GHG emissions. Part III introduces a contemporary example of the type of transparency regulation promoted by this Note-the conflict minerals legislation passed as part of the Dodd-Frank finance reform bill (DoddFrank). In Part IV, this Note will propose a regulatory structure similar to that put in place through Dodd-Frank, in which companies are required to self-report supply chain data. Part IV will also propose the expansion of the SEC's current climate change disclosures and advocate for a more effective dissemination of the data disclosed, particularly through implementation of a rating program. Part V will discuss current and anticipated challenges to the approach proposed in Part IV.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND DOMINANCE OF COMMAND-AND-CONTROL REGULATION IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The development of regulatory law and the administrative state in the United States began in 1887, with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act.
1 The Interstate Commerce Act created the first administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, 2 designed to remedy the disproportionate bargaining power railroads had when making contracts with businesses for the shipping of goods.
3 Congress set out to regulate this relationship by enacting price-setting measures, mandating that railroads abide by the pricing and reporting guidelines provided in the Act or incur a penalty. 4 This form of regulatory law-where an actor is given strict instruction and compelled to follow it in the face of a penalty-is commonly known as command-and-control regulation. 5 In this sense, the strict instruction is the command, and the threat of penalty is the control. As the nation grew, the administrative state grew along with it-experiencing rapid growth in the post-Depression New Deal era and again in the mid-1960s with the addition of energy sector regulation, work place safety initiatives, consumer protections, and environmental regulation. 6 Now, in 2017, there are over 400 federal administrative agencies in the United States. Though the administrative state continues to gain influence over private individuals and industry in the United States, some federal agencies have not deviated from the standard command-and-control model of regulation that was first implemented under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.
8 Federal environmental regulations, principally administered through the The EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) that must be met. 13 These NAAQS are set for each air pollutant the EPA considers reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare and that results from numerous or diverse mobile (i.e. vehicles) or stationary sources (i.e. industrial stacks).
14 Regulated entities are required to obtain permits for emitting listed air pollutants and those permits are managed by a state environmental agency through State Implementation Programs (SIP). 15 Once a SIP has been approved, it is administered by the state environmental agency. 16 Even though control is transferred to the state agency, the federal government retains the right to impose sanctions on individuals who violate the federally-approved SIP, or to issue an administrative penalty or file a civil action against any state who fails to enforce the approved SIP.
17 If the SIP fails to achieve the NAAQS attainment goals set by the EPA, or if a state fails to submit a SIP entirely, the EPA Administrator has the right to impose 9 See Case, supra note 5, at [62] [63] Policy Act] more than two decades ago, more specific environmental goals have been set and legislated, giving rise to the command-and-control system of environmental regulation that exists today."); Short, supra note 5, at 684 (stating that over 58% of all scholarly articles written on commandand-control regulation from 1980 to 2005 discussed environmental law specifically, and speculating that its prominence as a topic in command-and-control scholarship was related to environmental regulations' tendency to regulate processes rather than simply setting targets).
12 42 U.S.C.S. § § 7401-31 (2016). 13 Id. § 7409. 14 Id. § 7408(a). 15 Id. § 7410. 16 Id. 17 Id. § 7413.
sanctions on the nonattainment areas. 18 These sanctions imposed by the federal government on noncompliant States motivate many State governments to impose sanctions on regulated entities through their own environmental regulatory laws, creating a layered system of command-andcontrol regulations, and shifting the liability for noncompliance from the State government to the individual polluters.
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II. WHY COMMAND-AND-CONTROL IS NOT WORKING There are several rationales that could account for the development and proliferation of command-and-control regulations in environmental regulatory law. For one, pollution is very hard to trace back to a single source-once a particulate or molecular pollutant is released into the air, for example, there is nothing that identifies that pollutant as belonging to a particular source. 20 By requiring potential polluters to go through a permitting process, the regulator can assert some control at the source, rather than attempting to trace a particular pollutant back to its origin after it has been emitted.
The permitting process involved in NAAQS is also administratively easier on the regulator-the agency places the burden on the polluter to come up with a comprehensive plan for mitigating emissions (within EPA 18 Mandatory sanctions are available under the Clean Air Act for noncompliant States and can take two forms, requiring a ratio of at least 2 to 1 emissions reductions within the nonattainment areas for new or modified major facilities and the imposition of highway funding sanctions. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7509(b). Pursuant to § 7410(m), the Administrator also has the authority to impose discretionary sanctions-for example, the Administrator may require compliance in a more flexible timeframe than the 18-and 24-month frameworks available under § 7509. guidelines), while the regulatory body needs only to review and decide to either approve or deny the plan. 21 The development of these plans often requires engineers and other environmental science professionals to perform extensive environmental evaluations, which can be both time consuming and expensive for the preparer, culminating in high compliance costs.
22 Keeping these costs with the polluter makes the system of regulation more feasible considering time and man-power constraints of regulatory offices. The importance of keeping certain chemicals out of the air could also be a motivating factor behind the relatively strict controls to which air pollutants are subject. Acute releases of certain toxins can cause dramatic increases in death and illness rates, while prolonged exposure to steady, low-level releases can cause chronic diseases like asthma, emphysema, cancer, or arteriosclerosis.
23 Implementing a market-or incentive-based regulatory scheme when there are lives at stake might be seen as an unnecessary risk.
Command-and-control legislation is certainly not without its critics. Since the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (the Act's administering body), the pollution control regulations prescribed by the Act have been widely criticized.
24 Professor Jodi Short, in her review of scholarly literature surrounding the concept of command-and-control, identified the five most common criticisms of the regulatory mode: (1) coercive, (2) bureaucratic, (3) costly, (4) legalistic, and (5) ineffective. 25 While each critique presents its own challenges to command-and-control regulations, arguably the most troubling from a lawmaker's perspective is the claim that the regulations are ineffective. There are a number of reasons why command-and-control may prove ineffective in certain contexts.
As previously mentioned, the United States' use of the command-andcontrol regulatory scheme has created an adversarial relationship between 21 regulators and industry. 26 This contentious relationship is related to two of Short's identified critiques-that command-and-control legislation is unnecessarily bureaucratic and coercive. Regulated entities that oppose command-and-control legislation view bureaucrats administering the law as too far removed from the realities of the industry, and resent the intrusion of government into how they operate their businesses. 27 This resentment leads to regulatory failure in portions of command-and-control legislation that rely on good faith, 28 as well as hostility towards citizen groups and other concerned parties. 29 Hostility towards the regulations only increases the likelihood of regulatory violations. 30 The problem with abandoning the type of standard-setting rules involved in command-and-control regulation in favor of a market-based approach is rather elemental: the majority of governmental regulations find justification and rationale in the market's failure to control certain behaviors or outcomes. 31 If the market were capable of controlling pollution levels, regulation would not have been necessary in the first place.
32 While deregulation would undoubtedly reduce costs for the regulated parties, there is an exhaustive historical record-not to mention one of the most infamous economic parables 33 -supporting the notion that when industry is unburdened by environmental regulation, there is no effective market-check 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Since regulators do not have the resources to constantly monitor the behavior of potential polluters, environmental regulation relies on the regulated entities' willingness to abide by the regulations even when the regulator isn't looking, so to speak. See Walker Wilson, supra note 11, at 233. 29 Id. at 237. 30 Id. at 232-45. 31 BREYER, supra note 6, at 7-8. 32 It is uncontroverted that industry had not developed market control for air pollution by the 1970s. Dense, visible smog covered many of the nation's cities and industrial centers, which helped promote passage of the Clean Air Act, the nation's first comprehensive pollution regulation legislation. Clean Air Act Requirements and History, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-actrequirements-and-history (last updated July 12, 2016 to prevent polluters from externalizing the costs of production, 34 creating ruinous societal costs. 35 While the cost might be a burden for industry, recent studies have shown that the benefits to society that result from industry regulation greatly outweigh the costs imposed on industry. 36 Although, based on these authorities and common sense, it seems unlikely that deregulation of air emissions would lead to any reduction in air pollution, the current system of command-and-control regulation is not perfect. Because many regulated parties view pollution regulations as a production cost, some become "amoral calculators," choosing to increase their profit by violating the law when the benefits of violation will exceed whatever penalties they might incur if a regulator were to catch them.
37 One solution to the amoral calculators problem could be to increase the penalties imposed on actors who exceed their permit limitations or to provide particularly stringent penalties for willful violations, effectively raising the 34 An externalized cost is a cost related to an individual's action that is not born by that individual, but is borne by another individual, group, or society as a whole. penalties to such a rate that would make it economically unfavorable to pollute and pay the fine rather than comply with the regulations. There are several issues with this solution, however. The first problem with increasing penalties lies in the disparity between the benefits of regulatory compliance and the industry costs in complying-polluting the air is not an act easily undone. 38 Carbon dioxide emitted from the first plant built during the Industrial Revolution at the turn of the nineteenth century still exists in the atmosphere today. 39 Increasing penalties may change some polluters' behavior, but others will likely continue their illegal polluting practices, hoping regulators will not discover their unlawful actions.
Additionally, increasing fines does not address the inherent difficulties in detecting the violations. Many air pollutants are not easily detected (carbon monoxide, for example, is colorless, odorless, and deadly), and determining whether or not a particular plant is in compliance would require access to the plant, which would in turn require notice of impending inspection, giving polluters the opportunity to come into compliance before the inspectors arrive.
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There is also, of course, the usual administrative plague of growing regulatory demands and shrinking regulatory budgets, leading to delayed and/or ineffective enforcement by the regulatory agency. 41 The number of facilities and the diversity of responsibilities most environmental regulators are assigned make it logistically impossible for comprehensive monitoring to occur at every site, so the regulators often rely on self-reported disclosures.
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Self-reporting could lead to companies' failure to follow proper disclosure requirements, to unwitting misreporting, or to intentionally misleading regulators by reporting false information. 
Where Do We Go From Here?
While it is true that regulated parties are often motivated by profit, it is unfair and inaccurate to claim that money is the only motivating factor behind industry action. Most companies, in addition to concern for the continued profitability of their business, are concerned with the creation and maintenance of a corporate identity (though the two are not necessarily entirely severable). 44 There are also moral considerations that contribute to a desired company culture and environmental or social responsibility policies. 45 By combining these two driving forces-developing a positive corporate identity and maximizing firm profits-transparency policies, like conflict minerals legislation, can supplement existing regulations by providing the benefit of building a positive corporate identity when companies comply with regulations. Requiring disclosure could allow the EPA and state regulators to relax pre-emission permitting requirements, giving the industry more flexibility to develop new methods of pollution control while still receiving detailed reports on industry compliance at the expense of the regulated party. The conflict minerals legislation provides an excellent example of a contemporary implementation of a mandated reporting transparency policy like the one that this Note proposes be used to supplement existing GHG emissions regulations.
III. SUPPLY CHAIN REGULATION THROUGH SEC CORPORATE FINANCIAL FILINGS-THE CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION OF DODD-FRANK
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank" or "the Act") was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. 46 Touted as an answer to many of the problems that lead to the Great Recession, the Act sought "to promote financial stability in the United States, by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, lessons-for-fighting-toxic-air. During those years, several residents had complained illnesses ranging from breathing problems to rashes, cancer, and infertility. Id. When asked about the agency's failure to detect and investigate the emissions sooner, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation commissioner blamed the department's failure to discover the violations on a lack of sophisticated equipment and the elusive nature of toxic pollutants. Id.
44 Short & Toffel, supra note 37, at 365-66. 45 Id. to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, . . . ." and, as noted at the end of this non-exhaustive list of goals, the Act was also to be used for "other purposes." 47 The Act spans an expansive 2,300 pages and touches ten different regulatory agencies, dealing mostly with supervision and regulation of financial institutions. 48 The subject of this Note, however, falls under the "other purposes" category: the regulation of the use of "conflict minerals" in consumer products. 49 Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank 50 was added to the bill under Section 15, titled "Miscellaneous Provisions."
51 Predictably, the conflict minerals regulations were originally introduced by Senators Feingold, Durbin, and Brownbank as a separate bill, titled "Congo Conflict Minerals Act," S. 891, 52 but, unsuccessful on its own, the senators ultimately instead decided to propose the bill's provisions as an amendment to Dodd-Frank. The conflict minerals language, after review by industry representatives, government agencies, and the Banking Committee, was added to the fourth draft of the bill on May 20, 2010, and eventually passed with the rest of the Act in July. 53 The conflict minerals legislation established a basis for the SEC to create a mandatory supply-chain reporting scheme for publicly traded companies that use conflict minerals in their products. 54 That scheme would, in turn, encourage companies to source the minerals outside of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and neighboring countries (the "Covered Countries"), where the trade of such minerals contributes to the 47 The legislation included in Dodd-Frank requires companies to disclose and make public annually if the minerals in their products originate or may have originated in the DRC or neighboring countries, and to provide information on due diligence and on source and chain of custody to the SEC, but did not provide for any sanctions for companies whose reports showed continued use of conflict minerals.
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The idea behind the mandatory reporting scheme developed through Section 1502 and subsequent SEC regulations was to increase transparency in the sourcing of conflict minerals, in hopes that American consumers and investors could make more informed decisions based on the companies' ethical practices, presumably favoring companies who avoided sourcing the minerals from areas in conflict over those that did not. 57 This type of legislation is known as a transparency policy. According to The Transparency Policy Project-an initiative seeking to improve and expand the use of transparency policies-a transparency policy is a "public requirement[] that corporations or other organizations disclose factual information to reduce public risks that those organizations create or flaws in their performance." 58 Transparency policies, unlike traditional commandand-control legislation, rely on market forces to compel companies to behave ethically, rather than relying on the imposition of fines or other disciplinary actions administered by the government. While this type of nationallymandated disclosure program is not entirely novel, 59 it is the first of its type to be implemented by the SEC with regard to consumer products. 55 Id. 
Successes and Shortcomings of the Conflict Minerals Regulations
The conflict minerals guidelines included in Dodd-Frank remain somewhat controversial and results have been slow to show. 60 The SEC regulations required that companies' first reports be filed by June 1, 2014, and according to a Government Office of Accountability report released in August of 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "the Report"), most companies were unable to determine the source of their conflict minerals, claiming that the information was too difficult to obtain from their suppliers. 61 So, the resulting disclosures of companies practicing due diligence in accordance with the SEC regulations were limited because the majority of companies surveyed in the Report maintained that they could not determine the origin of the minerals in their supply chains. 62 Even though the goals of promoting transparency to the consumer and investors may not have been fully realized due to insufficiencies in reporting mechanisms, there is tangible evidence to show that the legislation had the intended effect of drastically reducing minerals sourced from the DRC or neighboring countries, which lead to the creation of "green mines" that had been freed from armed rule in the Covered Countries and prompting the government in those countries to work with the United States to assure trade from these mines would not fuel violence.
effects the law has had in the region provide enough evidence that the policies have effected positive changes in the region, even if the reporting has not been as effective as Congress envisioned when it passed the bill.
VI. THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND NATIONAL COMMITMENTS TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION-WHY TRANSPARENCY POLICIES COULD WORK NOW
On December 12, 2015, President Obama signed the United Nations Framework on Climate Change's Paris Agreement, committing to implement policies within the United States designed to hold the increase of global temperature rise to two degrees Celsius. 64 In order to achieve that goal, each signing country is required to develop Nationally Determined Contributions to serve as an outline for implementing required GHG emissions policy changes. 65 The United States took an understandably broad approach to its NDC submission, projecting an economy-wide target of reducing GHG emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels, making best efforts to reach a 28% reduction by 2025. 66 The Paris Agreement represents our nation's global commitment to stop the potentially catastrophic events that may result with an average global temperature increase of two degrees Celsius. It has long been recognized that developing countries, especially island nations, stand to lose the most as a result of warming. 70 At the current rate of warming, and if trends continue, the Maldives, a small island nation in the Indian Ocean, will be completely submerged. 71 This result is not only tragic for the people of the Maldives that will become a stateless nation if this warming continues, but it also implicates western, developed nations. The United States has been emitting GHGs into the atmosphere in prodigious proportions for the past 200 years, arguably contributing the most out of any country in the world to anthropogenic warming. 72 Because of our wealth and the sheer land mass of the United States, however, we who contributed the most and who have benefited the most from the emissions of GHGs into the atmosphere will be largely insulated from the early effects of climate change.
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The press and media coverage surrounding the Paris Agreement also signifies a change in social awareness and interest in climate change policy among citizens. 74 While the United States as a nation still remains among the most skeptical about climate change, 75 studies show that the majority of Americans agree with regulating GHGs in an effort to curb the effects of climate change, a change in opinion that has increased steadily over the past nine years. 76 This increase in public engagement with climate change issues is essential to the success of a potential transparency policy. Concerns about climate change will hopefully motivate American consumers to consider the environmental policies of companies before patronizing them or investing in them. Such concerns might also motivate companies to make efforts to reduce GHG emissions in anticipation of the market favoring more ethical practices, just as companies did in response to the conflict minerals legislation.
There are some inherent parallels between the humanitarian concern driving Congress to pass the conflict minerals legislation and the potential introduction of GHG supply chain emissions regulations. The conflict minerals legislation was passed in recognition of American companies' contributions to the on-going civil war in the DRC. 77 Since the United States cannot exert direct control over the way minerals are mined in foreign states, it instead opted to construct a framework of reporting that incentivized companies to ethically source the minerals. In the context of GHG emissions, mandated GHG emissions reporting for all companies whose production processes meet a certain threshold could not only be a solution to the current regulatory rut in environmental policy, but could also act as a check on American business owners acting with global consequences when they release GHGs into the atmosphere. Congress can separate supply chain GHG regulations from traditional environmental command-and-control legislation and take them out of the adversarial context by regulating them under the SEC.
Apart from the humanitarian purposes of reducing the United States' emissions of GHGs which are parallel to the goals of the conflict minerals rules, there is another compelling connection between climate change and the climate-denial-most-prevalent (stating that the United States had more climate deniers respond in the twenty-country survey than any other 
